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This project attempts to increase public awareness of published data and reporting
surrounding activities in relations to the Chinese artificial islands in the South China Sea and the
impact it has on U.S and China relations. The United States is totally focused on internal politics
and the U.S news media isn’t focused on the potential impact these artificial islands in the South
China Sea could potentially lead the U.S to conflict and war.
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Abstract
This is an integrative literature review of various perspectives of different authors of previous
scholarly articles discussing the impact of China’s artificial Islands in the South China Sea and
how it affects U.S. China relations in the region. This research covers a range of parameters
surrounding how the artificial islands were made and how they affect the overall security of
naval operations and will also discuss international waterway rights within the South China Sea,
one of the World’s biggest trading routes. A review of current events in the region is discussed
highlighting the potential powder keg that could explode and how it can provide a starting point
to summarize and identify the seriousness of the current fluid situation that is changing daily and
how it potentially impacts the region. By conducting this integrative literature review the author
aims to present a wholesome picture to educate the public about events that are shaping the
region in the South China Sea. The results of this study will add clarity and awareness to the
events in the region and how they impact the United States and China relations. The hope is that
this research creates a dialogue that addresses the strategic impact these artificial islands are
having on the United States and China relations in the region of the South China Sea.
Keywords: Strategic impact, Offensive threat, Defensive threat, Global security,
Militarization, International waters, Current events

THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF CHINA’S ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS

IV

Table of Contents
Title Page…………………………………………………………………………………i
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………ii
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………......iii
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………...iv
Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………v
List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………vi
Chapter One: Introduction……………………………………………………………….1
Significance of Study………………………………………………………….…5
Research Objective……………………………………………………………….6
Chapter Two: Research Method………………………………………………………….7
Literature Search………………………………………………………………….9
Limitations……………………………………………………………………….10
Data Evaluations…………………………………………………………………10
Data Analysis and Interpretation…………………………………………………11
Chapter Three: Findings………………………………………………………………….12
Finding One: ……………………………………………………………..........…12
Findings Two: ……………………………………………………………………14
Findings Three: ………………………………………………………………….19
Findings Four: ……………………………………………………………...……22
Chapter Four: Discussion………………………………………………………………...28
China Perspective……………………………………………………………...…34
U.S. Perspective………………………………………………………………….35

THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF CHINA’S ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS

V

Chapter Five: Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research…………………………39
References………………………………………………………………..………………45
Appendix B: Approval Authority…………………………………………….…….…….52

THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF CHINA’S ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS

VI

List of Figures
Figure 1: Mischief Reef before dredging picture………………………………………….2
Figure 2: Mischief Reef after dredging picture…………………………………………....2
Figure 3: Fiery Cross Reef before dredging picture………………………………………3
Figure 4: Fiery Cross Reef after dredging picture………………………………...………3
Figure 5: Woody Island after dredging picture……………………………………………4
Figure 6: The South China Sea picture with Adjacent States and Territorial Claims…….15
Figure 7: Potential oil reserves and Natural Gas in the SCS…………………………….31
Figure 8: Countries involved in the region and their known military assets………………38
Figure 9: Summary of South China Sea Strategic Options……………………………….40
Figure 10: Those Countries supporting China in Red and blue for opposing China…….41

THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF CHINA’S ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS

1

Chapter One: Introduction
The South China Sea has drawn intense attention worldwide in recent years, due to the
strategic developments in that area initiated by the People’s Republic of China. The Japan Times
(2018), reported that “In December 2013, the Chinese government pressed the massive Tianjing
dredger into service at Johnson South Reef in the Spratly archipelago, far from the Chinese
mainland” (Chellaney, Dec. 2018, para. 2). To construct its artificial islands, China had to have a
base to build on. China chose to build on existing, islands, rocks, and even coral reefs. In order to
build an island that can support airstrips and other military installations requires a lot of material.
China chose to use dredgers, and ships designed to pick up and move materials from the seafloor.
“These dredgers use large tubes with cutting attachments at the end to grind up material on the
seafloor and suck it up. From there, the material is carried through pipes or hoses and dumped on
top of reefs, rocks, and other existing formations” (Nicol, 2017, para. 6). Chellaney, (2018),
states “since then, China has built six more artificial islands in the South China Sea and steadily
expanded its military assets in this highly strategic area, through which one-third of global
maritime trade passes” (Chellaney 2018, para.4).
Below are several before and after pictures of the artificial islands that were developed by
China in the South China Sea.
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Figure #1, Dredgers reinforce a site being constructed on the westernmost part of
Mischief Reef, located 216 km (135 miles) west of the Philippine island of Palawan.

CSIS Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative/DigitalGlobe
Figure #2 After Dredgers reinforce Mischief Reef, located 216 km (135 miles) west of
the Philippine island of Palawan

CSIS Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative / DigitalGlobe
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Once the islands are large and stable enough, China then uses cement in order to
strengthen the base and build structures on that. Look at the changes below on the Fiery Cross
Reef in 2006.
Figure #3: Fiery Cross Reef before China converted it into an artificial island

CSIS Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative / DigitalGlobe
Figure #4: Fiery Cross Reef, after China converted it into an island.

CSIS Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative / DigitalGlobe
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Figure #5: Woody Island another island China has converted.

CSIS Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative / DigitalGlobe
This integrated literature review explores the complexity surrounding China’s building of
the artificial islands in the South China Sea. Forbes (2019) states that China is raising tensions in
the region with neighboring Nations such as the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and
Vietnam. China is also interfering with allied navies such as the United States, Japan, France, the
United Kingdom, and Australia. (Mourdoukoutas, 2019, paras. 13-14). The security situation is
changing daily which is increasing tensions in the region. “The developments in the South China
Sea carry far-reaching strategic implications for the Indo-pacific and for the international
maritime order” (Chellaney, Apr. 2018, para 2). This integrative literature review analyses
international waterways right of way claims and China’s claim of sovereignty of these artificial
islands. This review also analyzes current events and how they are shaping and increasing
tensions in the South China Sea.

THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF CHINA’S ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS

5

Interest in the topic is two-fold. The people of the World especially in the United States
are unaware of the implications of these artificial islands and the potential impact it could have
on all spectrums of geopolitical topics that we are dealing with today. For the last four years the
American news media has been totally focused on politics that are negatively affecting the
Presidents status and not recognizing the tensions surrounding the artificial islands in the South
China Sea and the potential for conflict. This research aims to cover the gap in public awareness
by attempting to build a wholesome and comprehensive picture of the situation in the South
China Sea, based on existing scholarly studies on the topic.
The second reasoning is self-guided. It’s important to be aware of the current events that
are occurring as it makes the daily news. This topic was chosen to increase the authors
understanding of the crisis and help educate others as well, of the impact these artificial islands
are having in the region of the strait of Hurmuz, one of the World’s biggest trading routes in the
South China Sea.
Significance of the study
This project discusses Chinese territorial claims of artificial islands in the South China
Sea (SCS) that have been built on existing reefs and atolls complete with military infrastructure.
At this point there is an opportunity to enhance public reporting and awareness by think tanks
such as the Center for Strategic International Studies’ Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative
(AMTI). While most of the military technology used by CSI/ AMTI is classified and out of reach
under the supervision of the U.S Government and foreign military, this study takes a novel
approach that combines a culmination of research that discussed China’s claims and the maritime
laws to analyze the over looked problem that experts project to be the core of future U.S
confrontation.
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Research Objective
This thesis is focused on the strategic impact of the artificial islands on the United States
and China relation in the region of the South China Sea. It discusses how China built the
artificial islands in the South China Sea and examines the existing and historical laws of
international waterways and the UN Convention on the law of the sea (UNCLOS). Coastal states
are also entitled to other maritime zones including contiguous zones and exclusive economic
zones (EEZ). This research examines why China thinks that these artificial islands they built are
included in China’s sovereignty and they are stating that they expect these islands to also have its
own exclusive economic zone. This research also discusses why China militarized these islands
when they originally said that they wouldn’t. Current events in the region are shaping forcing
China and the United States to react by conducting military training exercises in the region of the
South China Sea.
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Chapter Two: Research Method
This five-stage integrative literature review was chosen due to the potential outcomes
associated with the process, including the opportunity to summarize existing knowledge, identify
gaps in research, and correlate current events in the region. Utilizing this process, a more
comprehensive understanding of events can be created. The integrative literature review
methodology chosen to synthesize literature from a wide range of sources allows an integrative
review for the inclusion of diverse methodologies, and it takes into consideration various
perspectives on the topic of interest. Russell, (2005) states:
This integrative literature review has many benefits to the scholarly reviewer, including
evaluating the strength of the scientific evidence, identifying gaps in current research,
identifying the need for future research, bridging between related areas of work,
identifying central issues in an area, generating a research question, identifying a
theoretical or conceptual framework, and exploring which research methods have been
used successfully The 5- stage integrative review process includes: Problem
identification, literature search, integrated data, evaluation, data analysis and
interpretation, and presentation of results (para.1).
It’s important to understand China’s history in the region and other countries historical
rights surrounding the South China Sea in international waters. With a clear understanding or a
better understanding of the legal rights to international waters, the author looks at the strategic
placement of China’s artificial islands and its attempts to militarize them. China denies that they
are using these islands in a military action towards aggression, but more for defense of China’s
land. China’s artificial islands are being made by dredging the ocean floor surrounding
submerged reefs. Once the islands are sufficiently solid, they cement the area and claim it as
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China’s land and state their right to defend it. China is placing anti-aircraft guns and radar
apparatus while building runways around structures that could house large numbers of troops. If
research supports that China is militarizing these artificial islands all must recognize China’s
potential military buildup and the threat it imposes to surrounding Nations and the international
community in international waters. The United States needs to support its allies in the region and
attempts to discuss diplomatic solutions while taking steps to protecting our interest and those we
support in the region. Research has been conducted to review policies and discuss current
sanctions and potential options to apply pressure to China or to get them to the table for a
peaceful solution. The U.S must also consider potential military options and actions regarding its
Naval fleet and troop placement by the United States and its allies. Researching articles related to
the questions below, examines information that is indirectly and directly related to getting
background information on international waters rights of way and legal determinations that
support or deny China’s claims to the artificial islands they are building and claiming as Chinese
sovereignty. This research also explored the possible evidence of China arming these artificial
islands and the militarization impact it will have in the region. Further research examines the
ways to approach China and stabilize the region as well as examining ways to potentially defend
the rights of the United States and the rights of their allies in the region.
The primary research question of this study is: What is the strategic impact of the
artificial islands on the United States and China relations in the region of the South China Sea?
The following secondary questions are also explored in this study:
1. How and why China built these artificial Islands?
2. What are the laws concerning international waterways?
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3. What are the potential strategic impacts of these artificial islands and how they affect
U.S and China relations?
4. How U.S and China’s actions regarding the artificial islands in the South China Sea are
transforming the region and potentially raising tensions?
Literature Search
This thesis is an integrative literature review of various perspectives of different authors
of previous scholarly articles discussing the building of these artificial islands in the international
waterways. Existing literature at times does not provide a clear analysis regarding classified data
and information. According to Salmon (2019) “many search strategies will yield far more
literature than any researcher, or team, can read. There are ethical dimensions to choosing what
to focus on. Bias can creep in here: it is important to read literature representing a good spread of
views and opinions, not only those you agree with. Then, when you have chosen what to read, it
is ethically necessary to read that work carefully” (Salmon, 2019, para. 4). This study uses an
integrative and systematic review of existing research critiques, and synthesizes existing data
directly related to this study. The following online databases were searched utilizing relevant key
terms: South China Sea, artificial islands, current events in the SCS, construction of the artificial
islands, geopolitics surrounding the SCS. Research was conducted using data from Asia
Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), World Bank Key Development Data Statistics, and
Airbus Intelligence.
Research was conducted on the construction of these artificial islands and international
waterway laws in the region and how these artificial islands are affecting U.S and China
relations. This review encompasses theoretical and empirical source criteria that could be used
for inclusion/exclusion for this thesis. A preliminary review of the literature was conducted to
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identify search terms relevant to the subject areas. The researcher concluded that the most
relevant results were found using the following key words: “artificial islands” “South China
Sea”, “laws of International waterways” “militarization of artificial islands”, “current events in
the South China Sea”.
The research contains an analyses and synthesis of the data that will draw parallels, point
out inconsistencies and contradictions that makes a conclusion in terms of the impact that these
artificial islands are having in the region of the South China sea.
Inclusion criteria were as follows: peer-reviewed, scholarly journal articles published in
English only, original research, systematic review, literature review, theoretical and conceptual
articles. The researcher included all results from 2001 to 2020. The initial literature search
produced a total of 150 citations.
Once search results were compiled, the author screened each title and abstract. After
review, the decision to include or exclude was documented. The author screened titles and
abstracts of each citation with a focus on the research topic. After a review of all articles, 42
studies were chosen for inclusion in the integrative review.
Limitations
The study results were limited to the articles contained in the databases searched. Each
database was intentionally searched because of the depth of the research content. The reader
should note that additional resources relevant to the topic may exist.
Data Evaluation
In an integrative review, four questions guided the research on the topic of discussion:
How China built these artificial Islands? What are the laws concerning international waterways?
What are the potential strategic impacts of these artificial islands and how they affect U.S and

THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF CHINA’S ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS

11

China relations? What are the current events in the region and how are they affecting the region?
In this research project, the researcher included only scholarly, peer reviewed articles.
Data analysis and interpretation
Data was reviewed by content and topics related to the artificial islands in the South
China Sea were isolated and categorized. Consistent with Whitmore and Knafl’s (2005)
methodology, data was analyzed inductively through identification of significant patterns or
content, themes related to the artificial islands in the South China Sea were isolated. This
integrative process applies a , and verification stages (Whitmore and Knafl, 2005), with a
continued focus on the research question which is “What is the Impact of China’s Artificial
Islands in the South China Sea and how its affecting U.S and China Relations?”.
This researcher will identify issues “related to specifying the review purpose, searching
the literature, evaluating data from primary sources, analyzing data, and presenting the results are
discussed. Data analysis methods of qualitive research are proposed as strategies that enhance the
rigor of combining diverse methodologies as well as empirical and theoretical sources in an
integrative review” (Whitmore and Knafl, 2005, para. 3).
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Chapter Three: Findings
This integrative review of the scholarly literature resulted in four key findings that are
discussed in detail further.
Finding one: The reason behind China’s strategic decision to build these artificial islands
is to increase its military capabilities and international trade advantages and control the
South China Sea (SCS).
Nicol, (2017) states “by transforming reefs and cays into military installations, China is
extending its military capabilities in the South China Sea. Airstrips, radar arrays, and all such
buildings give China the ability to project force throughout the region” (Nicol, 2017, para. 9).
Japanese scholar Taoka Shunji (2015) states:
in a journal article that when it came to China's advance in the South China Sea and the
Spratly Islands, the assumption amongst many Japanese people that the territory of the
Philippines was being invaded was incorrect. According to him, "in the 1898 Treaty of
Paris in which Spain ceded the Philippines to the US, the object of cession was east of
118 degrees longitude (116 in the South); and the Spratly Islands fall outside (West) of
that line. The US therefore did not claim these islands to be the US territory when in 1938
Japan declared them to be Japanese territory and incorporated them as connected to
Taiwan under the name of ‘Shinnan Gunto’. The Japanese government now considers the
territorial status of these islands ‘undetermined. (para.14).
Nicol (2017) states that “The Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) published
a report claiming that China has installed weapon platforms on the island, based on recent
satellite images. These weapons include large anti-aircraft guns and probable close-in weapons
systems (CIWS),” (para. 18). These type of weapon systems are used to shoot down nearby

THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF CHINA’S ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS

13

aircraft or used for defense. Why is China weaponizing these islands? Do they have a long-term
goal? Will they use these artificial islands as launching pads for invasion? There are many more
questions yet answered. It is no wonder surrounding countries are concerned with China’s
expansion.
Here are more potential reasons why China might be expanding in the region. According
to Nicol (2017):
the South China Sea is one of the busiest trade routes in the world. According to
information gathered by the council on Foreign Relations, more than $5.3 trillion worth
of shipping travels through the sea each year; $1.2 trillion of this trade belongs to the
United States. Beyond its importance as a trade route, the South China Sea may also
contain bountiful resources beneath the surface. The U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA) estimates that there are 11 billion barrels of oil in the South China
Sea, as well as 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. As East Asia continues to grow in
importance, these resources — and who gets to control them — will become more
important (paras. 10-11).
Nicol (2017 also states the region is also one of the most important fishing zones in the world. In
fact:
12 percent of the global catch comes from the South China Sea. Astonishing as it may
sound, this may be a far bigger point of contention than the fuel reserves. Fishing is a
crucial industry for China, which is currently the largest producer of fish in the world.
China accounts for 17.4 percent of the world’s marine catch, nearly three times that of
runner up Indonesia, according to a report from the Center for Naval Analyses. China is
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also the world’s biggest exporter of fish products, with nearly $20 billion in exports in
2013 (para.12).
China now has six reefs that have structures that are or could house military personnel
and radar structures. They have; Fiery Cross Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Johnson South Reef,
Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and Gaven Reef. All these reefs sit right in the middle of the South
China Sea which is the biggest shipping lane for all countries. In addition, these reefs have
military capabilities such as runways, troop housing along with safe harbors for ships and radar
capabilities and anti-aircraft guns. It is no wonder why all the surrounding countries feel
threatened by China’s encroachment.
Finding Two: China’s artificial islands have negatively impacted the coastal lines
sovereignty of the neighboring countries.
The UN Convention on the law of the sea (UNCLOS) creates the legal guidance for all
use of the oceans. Beckman (2013) explains that "Brunei Darussalam, China, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Vietnam are the claimant states that have competing claims to territorial
sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea” (pg. 142, para 2).
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Figure #6: The South China Sea with Adjacent States and Territorial Claims

Maritime Zones under the UNCLOS state that “Coastal states have sovereignty over their
land territory as well as over a 12 nm belt of sea adjacent to their coasts called the territorial sea”
(Beckman, 2013, p.145). There are questions from all surrounding countries of whether the
straight baselines of the bordering states around the South China Sea are in line with the
UNCLOS provisions:
Article 6 of the Convention provides that the normal baseline for measuring the breadth
of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast. Article 7 provides that in
particular circumstances, states may employ straight base lines. The baselines employed
by China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam, have been, on various
occasions, questioned by third parties such as the United States (Beckman, 2013, p.146).
The main issue for discussion is the question of when using straight baselines is
whether they limit the rights of passage for foreign vessels? The rule is that waters from
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land and 12 nautical miles out are internal waters, which would mean that foreign vessels
would have to request permission to enter. China is essentially building these artificial
islands and claiming them as sovereignty and expecting the 12 nm belt of sea as
territorial sea. Coastal states are also entitled to other maritime zones including
contiguous zones and exclusive economic zones (EEZ), and a continental shelf. All states
bordering the South China Sea claim a territorial sea, an EZZ, and a continental shelf
from their baselines along their main coasts and the precise limits of their EEZ and
continental shelf claims aren’t clearly identified. With a 200 nm exclusive economic zone
you can understand the concern neighboring countries have over these artificial islands
and China’s claim of sovereignty over them. China now claims these artificial islands as
sovereignty and expects maritime zones to apply as well.
UNCLOS makes important distinctions between offshore geographic features such as;
(1), islands, (2) rocks, (3) low-tide elevations, (4) artificial islands, installations, and structures,
and (5) submerged features (Beckman, 2013, p.149).
Article 121 states:
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone,
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined
in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land
territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf (Usuki, 2015, p. 153).
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Borger & Phillips state that “China’s claims on the Spratlys and the Paracel islands to the
north, are based more on historic settlement rather than geographical proximity. As the regime in
Beijing has built up its long-distance “blue water” navy it has become increasingly assertive,
bolstering its claims with accelerating construction work, and shrugging off calls for a regional
negotiation settlement on the Spratlys’ future” (para.4.)
Borger & Phillips also state “there are legal issues, but China’s standing is weak. Other
countries’ have equally strong, if not stronger, historical claims. Beijing is also ignoring the UN
Convention on Law of the Sea and is dodging multilateral negotiated solutions, preferring to
create “facts on the sea”. That raises the question of how far Washington D.C. is prepared to go
in calling China’s bluff” (para.8).
International Policy Digest reported that “China is quietly attempting to build an artificial
island upon the Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands. Furthermore, Beijing is also planning
similar activities in several other reefs of this archipelago. This is a dangerous intrigue and might
give China significant advantages in SCS disputes. (Nguyen, 2014, para.1).
Philippines former National Security Adviser, Roilo Golez states:
Chinese jets can easily reach the entire Philippines, Vietnam, and parts of Malaysia
within Fiery Cross’s 1,000-mile radius. Consequently, the national security of these
countries will be seriously threatened. Furthermore, a chain of artificial islands in the
Spratlys will form a block allowing China to strengthen its air and maritime surveillance
in the SCS” (Nguyen, 2014, para 8).
The South China Sea is one of the most used sea lanes and is recently becoming a center
of political tensions because of China’s attempt to legitimize their claims to expand their territory
and reduce the abilities of other Countries to navigate in international waters. The United States
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created a treaty of mutual defense with the Philippines in 1951 and the artificial islands could
draw the United States to support the defense of the Philippines legal claims. Economic Times
(2014) reports that “China claims sovereignty over almost the whole of the South China Sea,
which is also claimed in part by Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines and is believed to
sit atop vast oil and gas deposits” (para. 1). Vietnam and China continue to argue over oil
exploration, fishing rights and ownership of the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Economic Times
also reports that Vietnam states that “the artificial islands fall into its 200-nautical-mile economic
zone. China has also announced its intention of moving their first oil rig into the disputed South
China Sea. Tensions are rising on all fronts in the disputed area” (para. 7).
In 2013, the Philippines grew frustrated with arbitration attempts with China regarding
maritime disputes surrounding the artificial islands and they filed a case against China’s claims.
Tetsuo (2016) states that:
In October 2015, the Tribunal issued an Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
deciding some issues of jurisdiction and deferring others for further consideration. On
July 12, 2016, the Tribunal made the final award. It accepted most of jurisdiction and
denied Chinese historic rights in the nine-dash line, clarified the legal status of some
features in the South China Sea, concluded that there is no island in the Spratly Islands
that can produce an EEZ or continental shelf, and found most of Chinese activities,
including law enforcement and marine environmental destruction in the South China Sea
unlawful under UNCLOS and other international law (para. 20).
Even though the Hague ruled against China’s claim, the tribunal as no way to enforce its
decision. China’s rejection of the Award poses a huge challenge to the UNCLOS regime. Tetsuo
(2016) also states the:
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UNCLOS is a package deal among navigational rights, sovereign rights, and compulsory
dispute settlement. As a party to UNCLOS, China accepted the compulsory dispute
settlement mechanism while enjoying navigational rights in the world waters and
sovereign rights in its EEZs and continental shelf. If the international community accepts
China’s position, that would lead to the collapse of the package deal and the entire
UNCLOS regime” (para.23).
This ruling can raise existing tensions with China’s neighbors and the U.S. Fravel
(2017) states:
China’s vigorous assertion of maritime claims can threaten its neighbors and push
them toward closer relations with the United States. Likewise, U.S. involvement
in the South China Sea can threaten China’s position in the disputes and can even
embolden states facing China, creating strong incentives for Beijing to push back
(pg. 234).
Free navigation in international waters is important to all countries that trade in
the SCS region.
Finding Three: The impact of China building these artificial islands in the South China Sea
have negatively affected relations between China and U.S and their allies, raising tensions
in regard to freedom of the seas operations in the SCS.
China wants to control all the South China Sea because they see it as China’s own
property. They state that they are prepared to defend all their land whether it be real or artificial.
Yale University Professor John Lewis Gaddis defines grand strategy as “the alignment of
potentially unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities.” (Mourdoukoutas, 2019,
para.6). This could mean that China is biting off more than it can chew. Mourdoukotas, (2019)
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also states “China may have a dot, a couple of artificial islands, but it does not have a second dot
to draw a line. They are one country against all the other nations with interests in the region: the
Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam” (para.13). China cannot forget that other
countries such as the Navies of US, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and Australia who want
to enforce the freedom of international trade waters. Forbes also reports that “China has made
great progress in building its military and naval capabilities” says Yannis Tsinas, a retired
Washington diplomat and Greek naval officer. “But it isn’t in any position to fight the US and its
allies.” (Mourdoukotas, 2019, para.16).
China’s island-building efforts require a heavy investment in engineering and
infrastructure. Digital Trends (2017) reports that:
The Spratly Islands and other nearby chains lack indigenous populations. As such, they
are claimed by the various neighboring nations. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and
China all claim portions of the South China Sea, but China’s claim is extraordinary.
Dubbed the “nine-dash line,” China’s claim (as presented to the United Nations in 2009)
covers most of the sea, extending down to the coast of Malaysia (Nicol, 2017, para. 9).
China is extending its military capabilities into the South China Sea. Airstrips, radar
arrays, and all buildings give China the ability to project force throughout the region. Asian
Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) published a report claiming that “China has installed
weapon platforms on the island, based on recent satellite images. These weapons include “large
anti-aircraft guns and probable close-in weapons systems (CIWS) which are designed to shoot
down nearby missiles and aircraft” (Nicol, 2017, para.19). This author is guessing that they
would be the last line of defense against cruise missiles launched by any country threatening its
installations. NBC News reports that:
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Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told a regular news briefing in
Beijing that he "did not understand, the situation referred to in the report. Beijing says the
manufactured islands are intended to boost maritime safety in the region while
downplaying their military utility. They also mark China's claim to ownership of
practically the entire South China Sea, its islands, reefs and other maritime features
(Flanagan, 2016, para.10).
NBC News (2016) also reports that “The Center for Strategic and International Studies
said in a report late Wednesday that the anti-aircraft guns and close-in weapons systems designed
to guard against missile attack have been placed on all seven of China's newly created islands”
(Flanagan, 2016, para.2).The South China Sea is one of the busiest trade routes in the world. Per
information gathered by the council on Foreign Relations, NBC News commented that “more
than $5.3 trillion worth of shipping travels through the sea each year; $1.2 trillion of this trade
belongs to the United States (Flanagan, 2016, para.12). Nicol (2017) also states that the other
reasons China is interested in controlling the SCS is that:
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that there are 11 billion
barrels of oil in the South China Sea, as well as 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. As
East Asia continues to grow in importance, these resources — and who gets to control
them — will become more important. The region is also one of the most important zones
in the world for fishing. In fact, 12 percent of the global catch comes from the South
China Sea. Astonishing as it may sound, this may be a far bigger point of contention than
the fuel reserves. Fishing is a crucial industry for China, which is currently the largest
producer of fish in the world. China accounts for 17.4 percent of the world’s marine
catch, nearly three times that of runner up Indonesia, according to a report from the
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Center for Naval Analyses. China is also the world’s biggest exporter of fish products,
with nearly $20 billion in exports in 2013 (para.13).
Teshu Singh (2012) states “the region has become a source of renewed interstate rivalries
because the issue has become closely associated with interrelated issues of energy, territorial,
maritime and military security” (para.19).
Finding Four: China’s artificial Islands have created tensions in the region involving the
surrounding countries and the U.S. Dispute Dynamics between all those involved in
operating in the SCS have increased and are fluidly changing every day.
Wikipedia (2011) reports that:
On 20 July 2011, the PRC, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam
agreed a set of preliminary guidelines on the implementation of the DOC (Declaration of
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea) which would help resolve disputes The
agreement was described by the PRC's assistant foreign minister, Liu Zhenmin, as "an
important milestone document for cooperation among China and ASEAN countries.
Some of the early drafts acknowledged aspects such as "marine environmental protection,
scientific research, safety of navigation and communication, search and rescue and
combating transnational crime", although the issue of oil and natural gas drilling remains
unresolved. "Following the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea (DOC), China and ASEAN countries actively advanced the
consultations on the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, with the forecast
that the COC will be completed by 2021 (Territorial disputes in the South China Sea,
para.14).
Wikipedia.org reported that:
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In 2012, the United States State Department press statement identified the PRC as an
assertive state in the region and communicated the United States worries about the
developments in the area. Also, in 2012, Secretary Clinton testified in support of
congressional approval of the Law of the Sea Convention, which would strengthen U.S.
ability to support countries that oppose Chinese claims to certain islands in the area
(Territorial disputes in the South China Sea, para. 51)
Wikipedia.org also reported:
In July 2012, “the United States Senate passed resolution 524, initially sponsored by
Senator John Kerry, stating (among other things) the United States' strong support for the
2002 declaration of conduct of parties in the South China Sea, reaffirms the United
States' commitment to assist the nations of Southeast Asia to remain strong and
independent, and supports enhanced operations by the United States armed forces in the
Western Pacific (Territorial disputes in the South China Sea, para.52).
According to Wikipedia.org:
In 2014, the United States responded to China's claims over the fishing grounds of other
nations by saying that "China has not offered any explanation or basis under international
law for these extensive maritime claims." China responded by asking “the United States
to maintain a neutral position on the issue. In 2014 and 2015, the United States continued
freedom of navigation operations, including in the South China Sea” para). Shortly
thereafter “on 27 October 2015, the US destroyer USS Lassen navigated within 12
nautical miles of reclaimed land in the Subi Reef as the first in a series of Freedom of
Navigation Operations. This is the first time since 2012 that the US has directly
challenged China's claims of territorial limit”. Then in November 2015, “two US B-52
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strategic bombers flew near artificial Chinese-built islands in the area of the Spratly
Islands and were contacted by Chinese ground controllers but continued their mission
undeterred” (Territorial disputes in the South China Sea, para.53).
As of May 2019, in an article from The Diplomat states “the United States has conducted
four freedom of navigation operations in the Spratlys during the early 2019 (Territorial disputes
in the South China Sea, para.54).
In 2019, The Diplomat reported that “The U.S. Navy confirmed the operation to Reuters,
noting that two Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers, USS Preble and USS Chung
Hoon, sailed within 12 nautical miles of Gaven and Johnson Reefs” (Panda, 2019, para.1). China
reacted angrily to the operation, “Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang told a
daily news briefing. China urges the United States to stop such provocative actions,” Geng
added” (Panda, 2019, para.3). Ankit Panda (2019) states “China claims most of the South China
Sea under its capacious nine-dash line claim. Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, and
Malaysia also have competing claims in the Spratly Islands” (para.4). With U.S.-China tensions
being high on trade the U.S. President Donald J. Trump tweeted “a threat to increase tariffs on
Beijing” (para.5).
June 2020, Fox News reported, “the U.S. Navy is operating three aircraft carriers in the
Pacific which appears to be a strong show of force following Chinese movements and comments
regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea” (Osborn, 2020, para.1). Fox news also reports “The
move, which includes the USS Theodore Roosevelt, USS Nimitz and USS Ronald Reagan,
brings an unusually strong U.S. presence. This kind of message has not been seen in recent years,
and it signals the fast-increasing significance of U.S. deterrence efforts regarding China”
(Osborn, 2020, para 2).
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“The Global Times, a Chinese-backed paper, also makes specific reference to China’s
well known “carrier killer” DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship missiles. Much has been discussed
regarding these weapons, as they are regularly reported to operate with a range of 900 miles, a
distance which some say could force U.S. carriers to operate at much farther standoff ranges”
(Osborn, 2020, para.4).
Politico (2018) reports that Chinese colleagues have stated “if the U.S. continues to sail
through and over-fly what they see as their waters, China will eventually shoot down the
offending aircraft” (Morgan, W. & Chan M., 2018, para.4). Politico also states that “U.S.
military leaders insist that they are determined to avoid that. Navy Admiral. Phil Davidson, the
U.S commander of the Indo-Pacific Command, told Politico he’s eager to open a new dialogue
with his Chinese counterparts, contending that a military to military relationship is quite
important” (Morgan, W. & Chan M., 2018, para.5). Marine General Joe Dunford states “ what
we are doing is preserving the principle of open access to the global commons, violating
international norms, standards and the law should know that they are going to pay a cost that is
higher than whatever they hope to gain” (Morgan, W. & Chan M., 2018, para.6). Politico states
“Beijing’s leaders are not backing down from their military expansion in the vast South China
Sea, which stretches more than 1.3 million square miles with trillions of dollars’ worth of trade
transiting annually” (Morgan, W. & Chan M., 2018, para 9). Politico reports:
Despite public assurances from President XI Jinping that the features would not be
militarized, China recently deployed surface-to-air missiles and other weapons and
equipment. Earlier this year, satellite images showed that Beijing has built at least four
airstrips suitable for military aircraft on Woody Island, as well as the reefs in the
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archipelago known as Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi” (Morgan, W. & Chan M., 2018,
para.10).
June 2020, News18 reports the leaders of the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN)
took the position in a statement issued by Vietnam Saturday on behalf of the 10-nation bloc. “We
have reaffirmed that the 1982 UNCLOS is the basis for determining maritime entitlements,
sovereign rights, jurisdiction and legitimate interest over maritime zones” the ASEAN statement
sent (para.3).
July 2020, CNN reporter Ryan Brown reports “the USS Nimitz and USS Ronald Reagan
Carrier Strike Groups are conducting dual carrier operations in the Philippine Sea and South
China Sea," (News 18, July 2020, para.2). Browne (2020) reports that Lt. Joe Jeiley, a
spokesman for the Seventh Fleet states "the presence of two carriers is not in response to any
political or world events. This advanced capability is one of many ways the U.S. Navy promotes
security, stability, and prosperity throughout the Indo-Pacific" (CNN, 2020, para.1). Brown
(2020) also reports that “the exercise is long planned but comes as China conducts military drills
of its own in the area, near the contested Paracel Islands, exercises that have been criticized by
the US and other countries” (para.3). CNN also reported that “While the US Navy routinely
operates in the area, the operation of two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers -- the USS Nimitz and
USS Ronald Reagan -- represents a significant show of force and comes amid heightened
tensions between Washington and Beijing over a number of areas, including Hong Kong”
(Browne, 2020, para.9).
July 2020, News18 reports “Vietnam and the Philippines have also criticized the planned
Chinese drills, warning they could create tension in the region and impact Beijing's relationship
with its neighbors” (para.1). News18 also reports “the United States accuses China of
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miniaturizing the South China Sea and trying to intimidate Asian neighbors who might want to
exploit its extensive oil and gas reserves” (para.9). News 18 also mentioned that “China claims
90% of the potentially energy-rich South China Sea, but Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Taiwan and Vietnam also lay claim to parts of it, through which about $3 trillion of trade passes
each year” (para.10).
When and if it comes to conflict, David Arase (2017) states “if the U.S. and China cannot
reach some kind of strategic accommodation, they will continue to move toward this outcome.
Meanwhile, other stakeholders may be forced to choose sides if or when a confrontation
materializes” (Showdown ahead, JSTOR, p.76).
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Chapter Four: Discussion
The chapter elaborates on the four findings discussed in chapter three surrounding the
artificial islands in the South China Sea.
Guinto (2014) states:
First, “Sand, cement, wood, and steel are China’s weapons of choice as it asserts its claim
over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea”. All these countries including China, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Brunei have argued for decades over
ownership of the 100 islands and reefs. Business Week wrote that “in recent months,
vessels belonging to the People’s Republic have been spotted ferrying construction
materials to build new islands in the sea. Artificial islands could help China anchor its
claim to waters that host some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes” (para.1-2).
Saunders (2019) states:
artificially created islands are a contemporary reality, created and used for military and
nonmilitary purposes. Analysis of such islands has largely been limited to their status
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regime. Their
position under general international law, however, remains unclear. In particular, the
question of whether artificial islands can constitute sovereign territory remains
unanswered (p.643).
Saunders (2019) mentions that “The Pentagon estimates that since early 2014, China has
reclaimed over 3,200 acres of land in the Spratly Islands archipelago to build new artificial
structures around existing maritime features. The Pentagon asserts that these actions “do not
provide China with any additional territorial or maritime rights within the South China Sea.”
(p.644).
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Saunders (2019) also states that:
Artificial islands built illegally (such as those in another state’s EEZ, or those that have
been built in breach of international environmental law), the building state is unable to
acquire title to the territory, unless their occupation is legitimized by the international
community. As such, continued protest around such illegally built artificial islands is
vital” (p.684).
Beckman (2013) states:
the second finding surrounds “coastal states that have sovereignty over their land
territory as well as over a 12 nm belt of sea adjacent to their coasts called the territorial
sea. Coastal states are also entitled to their maritime zones beyond their territorial seas,
including a contiguous zone, an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and a continental shelf”
also states All of the states bordering the South China Sea, as well as Taiwan, claim a
territorial sea, an EEZ, and a continental shelf measured from the baselines along their
mainland coasts or, in the case of Indonesia and the Philippines, from their archipelagic
baselines. Unless China decides to bring its maritime claims into conformity with
UNCLOS, serious differences will remain between the position of China and that of the
Philippines and Vietnam on how UNCLOS applies to the maritime claims in the South
China Sea. If China continues to assert its claims to maritime space in a manner that the
Philippines and Vietnam believe is not consistent with UNCLOS, their only recourse may
be to attempt to bring China before an international court or tribunal too obtain a legally
binding decision that China’s actions are contrary to UNCLOS (p.161). The journal of
international law also states although UNCLOS is of no assistance in resolving the
territorial sovereignty claims to islands in the South China Sea, it contains important rules
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and principles that govern the validity of claims with respect to the South China Sea
itself, including marine features and areas, and has important provisions regarding the
management and resolution of disputes that may arise in that respect. The journal of
international law states unless China is willing to bring its maritime claims into
conformity with UNCLOS, it will continue on a legal collision course. In that event its
ASEAN neighbors may conclude that, because they cannot match the political, economic,
and military power of China, they have no recourse but to attempt to invoke the dispute
settlement system in UNCLOS in order to challenge the legality of China’s maritime
claims (p.163).
Zha, 2001states the third finding is that:
The geographical location of the South China Sea also makes it a “security concern” to
nation-states that are not a direct party to the sovereignty disputes. To the south, the Strait
of Malacca connects the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean. To the north, the Taiwan
Strait connects the South China Sea to the Pacific Ocean. For centuries, these
geographical connections have made the South China Sea significant for European
commercial and military adventures in continental East Asia” (p.36).
Rowan (2011) wrote in the University of California Press that states:
the geopolitical considerations in the South China Sea is the world’s second-busiest
international shipping lane. Each year, more than half of the world’s supertanker trafﬁc
passes through the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok, with the majority of seafaring
trafﬁc continuing on to China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. This shipping is
primarily raw materials and energy resources—crude oil, liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG),
coal, and iron ore—en route to these East Asian nations. With respect to oil and LNG, the
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amount transported through the South China Sea is three times greater than that traveling
through the Suez Canal and 15 times greater than the amount transported through the
Panama Canal. The majority of this crude oil comes from the Persian Gulf and is bound
for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (p.416).

Figure #7: Potential oil reserves and natural gas in the SCS and rising tensions along
with military buildup could spell disaster.

In addition, Rowan (2011) mentions:
its importance as a shipping lane, the South China Sea region contains potentially
vast oil reserves. Oil deposits have been found in many of the continental shelves
surrounding the sea. Currently, this region retains proven oil reserves of seven
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billion barrels and a production capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day. The
discovery of oil in adjacent littoral countries has fueled speculation that there
could be a massive reserve, located near several nations with growing demand for
oil. But because there has been no exploratory drilling near the Spratly and
Paracel Islands, there are no proven oil reserves for those areas and estimates vary
greatly (p.417).
Nguyen (2014) states:
According to the Philippines former National Security Adviser, Roilo Golez, Chinese jets
can easily reach the entire Philippines, Vietnam, and parts of Malaysia within Fiery
Cross’s 1,000-mile radius. Consequently, the national security of these countries will be
seriously threatened. Furthermore, a chain of artificial islands in the Spratlys will form a
block allowing China to strengthen its air and maritime surveillance in the SCS. Like
Roilo Golez said, China will then have a strong incentive to establish an Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the SCS, similar to the one in the East China Sea (para.8).
The fourth finding discusses events that have occurred in the SCS and how they are
raising tensions in the region. Challeney (2018) stated in the Japan Times that:
the Chinese did not leave that outcome to chance. Before they began building their
islands in the South China Sea, they spent several months testing possible U.S. reactions
through symbolic moves:
A. June 2012, China seized the disputed Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, without
eliciting a tangible international response.
B. In September 2013, China launched its next test: It sent the Tianjing dredger to
Cuarteron Reef, where it stayed for three weeks without initiating any land reclamation.
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The United States, under President Barack Obama, did not push back, emboldening
China to start its first island-building project, at Johnson South Reef. Obama’s last
defense secretary, Ash Carter, has criticized his former boss’s soft approach toward
China. In a recent essay, Carter wrote that Obama, “misled” by his own analysis, viewed
as suspect “recommendations from me and others to more aggressively challenge China’s
excessive maritime claims and other counterproductive behaviors (para.6-11).
Chellaney (2018) states, “President Donald Trump’s administration is grappling with the
consequences of Obama’s approach. Trump wants to implement a vision of a “free and open
Indo-Pacific.” The “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy is the successor to Obama’s unhinged
“pivot” to Asia” (para.12).
Japan Times also mentions that “from its newly built perches in the South China Sea,
China is better positioned not only to sustain air and sea patrols in the region, but also to advance
its strategy of projecting power across the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. How can there
be any hope of a free and open Indo-Pacific, when the critical corridor linking the Indian and
Pacific oceans is increasingly dominated by the world’s largest autocracy?” (Chellaney, 2018,
para.13).
Japan times mentions that:
China’s territorial grab, a triumph of brute power over rules, exposes the vulnerability of
the current liberal world order. The geopolitical and environmental toll is likely to rise,
major costs on the region’s states and reshaping international maritime relations
imposing. Major costs on the region’s states and reshaping international maritime
relations” (Chellaney, 2018, para.14).
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China perspective
Center for a New American Security wrote:
China’s broadest objectives are visible in the statements of Xi Jinping and the Chinese
government. They include: achieving national reunification (not just with Hong Kong and
Macao but also Taiwan—which puts Taiwan in a unique position as both a rival claimant
and a claimed territory); defending sovereignty, including territories and waters claimed
as part of China; preserving the power of the CCP; returning China to center stage in
international affairs; and achieving the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation, which is
most often defined in economic terms such as building a moderately prosperous society
and making a modern socialist country.
From broad national goals, concrete objectives regarding the South China Sea and
Southeast Asia can also be culled from official statements or deduced from Beijing’s
actions. These include:
a. Control claimed territory (disputed islets and waters) and prevent rival claimants
(especially the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia) from increasing control over the
same
b.

Increase control over the airspace and seas of the South China Sea and seek to
overwhelm regional militaries (including those of the claimant states as well as those of
Singapore and Indonesia)

c. Control the resources within the nine-dash line area and decrease the control of those
resources by others
d. Legitimize China’s policies and the CCP at home and abroad ¡ Delegitimize unfavorable
rules (parts of UNCLOS) and rivals (the United States, Japan)
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e. Increase China’s influence over regional neighbors’ key policies and decrease the
influence of others over those neighbors
f. Coopt regional leaders and build a network of supportive or at least nonaligned clients
and weaken unity between the United States and its allies and Southeast Asian states
g. Develop information superiority through all means and erode other states’ advantages in
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); innovation; and advanced
technology
h.

Preempt or defeat “outside” military intervention into the first island chain (sea
control), and, at a minimum, block the same within the second island chain (sea denial)
Center for a New American Security also states, in short, China is seeking to expand
its positive control over the South China Sea and Southeast Asia. Leaving aside the
unknowable question of future Chinese intentions, the CCP plans to be in the driver’s
seat in Southeast Asia in the coming years, and the implications for the strategic
autonomy of its neighbors and freedom of the seas are both in potential peril (p.14).

U.S perspective
The U.S Naval War College wrote, “today, the situation in the South China Sea is
reaching a critical stage as Chinese advances accumulate, America’s room for maneuver
diminishes, and observers throughout the region wonder whether the United States is up to the
challenge. And yet Washington still is searching for a strategy” (Brands, and Cooper, 2019, p.1).
Brands and Cooper also mentions:
So far, the Trump administration too has struggled to articulate an effective approach.
The Trump administration focused on bilateral trade and North Korea as the dominant
issues in U.S.-China relations” More importantly they state that “although the U.S
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military has conducted freedom-of navigation operations (FONOPs) to challenge China’s
(and other states’) excessive claims, the administration has given the impression—which
has been noted in key countries such as Vietnam—that it lacks an overall strategy for
addressing Chinese advances (Brands, and Cooper, 2019, p.5).
Business insider reports that:
Trump is trying to shove 4 years of China policy into 4 months. The Trump
administration has pivoted from the US's policy of strategic ambiguity toward China, to
open rivalry over the last few weeks”
Business insider also reports the recent below actions that the U.S is taking against
China;


Trump is set to sign an order demanding that China based ByteDance sell its
US operations of popular app TikTok and said Friday he plans to ban TikTok
in the US.



The US shut down the Chinese consulate in Houston.



The US placed sanctions on Chinese officials involved with human rights
violations in Hong Kong and Xinjiang.



The White House is considering banning Communist Party members (roughly
90 million people) from the US.



The State Department made noise about China's "unlawful" buildup of
military bases in the South China Sea.



The US retaliated against China for a crackdown on US journalists with a
crackdown on Chinese journalists in the US” (Lopez, 2020, p.1).
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Business week also mentions that “former State Department official told me that
Chinese officials understand that Trump is at his most dangerous now. He's looking at his
flagging poll numbers, the shortening calendar before the election and trying to impress his
base” (Lopez, 2020, p.2).
Lopez (2020) states that:
China needs the US market; the US market is on its knees. It would be nice if the two
powers could talk this situation out, but as Guggenheim Investments Chief Investment
Officer Scott Minerd this move from a policy of strategic ambiguity with China to one of
open hostility has made cooperation unlikely (Lopez, L. 2020, p.3).
Fox news states:
the Trump administration has been ramping up pressure against Chinese influence across
the globe since the outbreak of COVID-19, which began in China and has drawn
accusations that the government covered up the seriousness of the virus until it was too
late and the virus became a global pandemic (Shaw, 2020, p.3).
Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo:
went on to cite opposition by Australia to Chinese moves in the South China Sea, as well
as other countries taking action to push back against Chinese security threats. Momentum
is building to mitigate CCP threats in multilateral settings, too, he said. All 10 ASEAN
nations have insisted that South China Sea disputes must be settled on the basis of
international law, including [United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea] (Shaw,
2020. Para.5-6).
Pompeo in another Fox news article mentions that "The world will not allow Beijing to
treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire, America stands with our Southeast Asian allies
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and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights
and obligations under international law.” (Mcfall, 2020, para.4).
Fox news also reports that:
Diplomatic relations have further strained due to China’s new security laws in Hong
Kong, their refusal to sign a nuclear arms trade deal with the U.S. and Russia, as well as
in the race to 5G -- in what the U.S. has said would be a massive security threat if China
is the first to succeed in its development and partnership with other counties (para.16).
As tensions rise between the U.S. and China, where will it lead? Look below at the
Countries that are involved in the SCS dispute and their military force structures to get a better
idea of what’s involved if it comes down to military action.
Figure #8: Countries involved in the region and their known military assets
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Chapter Five
Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research
The New York Times reported that:
Three different logics have been constructed to substantiate the "China threat" thesis.
First, ideological and cultural factors make China a threat. For people using this logic, the
sensible response from the U.S. is, in the short run, a containment policy, and
confrontation is possible if needed, in the long run, the promotion of a peaceful
transformation within China.
Second, for many realists, even China has shed off its ideological straitjacket, as a great
power in size (territory, population, and economy), China must pursue its own interest
and respect. Nationalism may still drive China into a course of clash with the United
States if the latter refuses to accommodate or share the leadership with China as a rising
power.
Third, the collapse of China. Opposed to the previous two perspectives, some people are
concerned that if China suffers a Soviet-style sudden-death syndrome and spins out of
control, it can create an even worse scenario. The sheer size of the population makes
refuge problem, the failed state and the followed crises (warlordism, civil war, crime,
proliferation of nuclear weapons, etc) impossible for the world to deal with. Due to these
three different considerations, the United States often oscillates from demonization to
romaticization of China, from containment to engagement. The U.S.-China relationship
has shifted from conflict, to confrontation, to competition and back to conflict, but so
rarely features with cooperation. One American China specialist characterizes the
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bilateral relationship as "the sweet-and-sour Sino-American relationship. (XIA,2006,
para.1-2).
The U.S Naval War College wrote another opinion which states:
What is needed is to elevate the strategic debate by identifying clearly—and assessing
rigorously—the main options for countering China’s offensive in the South China Sea.
Four basic strategies are available for steering the proper course in a turbulent South
China Sea.
Figure #9: China Sea strategic options

(Brands, and Cooper, 2019, p.2).
The U.S Naval War College reports that:
Containment and offset are not mutually exclusive, however, so the best approach for
U.S. policy makers would be to combine the most compelling aspects of these two
strategies, while seeking to avoid some of their associated liabilities. Specifically, the
United States should contain the most destabilizing Chinese activities while offsetting
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and penalizing less threatening behavior. The containment elements of a new strategy
would demonstrate that the United States is willing to accept short-term risk—including
military risk—to prevent China from coercing regional states and consolidating control of
additional features in the South China Sea.
The offsetting elements of the strategy, meanwhile, would seek to ensure that China
suffers long-term losses whenever it obtains any short-term gains coercively (Brands, and
Cooper, 2019, p.16)
Figure #10: Those countries supporting China in red and blue for opposing China

Source: China Daily
As you can see above, more than 70 countries support China and think the Sea disputes
should be resolved through negotiations, not arbitration.
The U.S Naval War College states if the United States wants:
to accomplish even the limited aims of this approach, it must be willing to accept greater
risks, incur higher costs, and impose more serious penalties on China than it has been
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willing to do to date. America has limped along without a clear or coherent approach in
the South China Sea for several years. Now is the time to get serious about strategy—
before it is too late” (Brands, and Cooper, 2019, p. 17).
Another avenue of approach from China Focus states:
For example, the institutionalization of the Australia-India-Japan-U.S. “Quad” has yet to
take off. In this light, the idea of a “Quad plus two” to include France and Britain seems
overly ambitious at this stage. Once the Quad takes concrete shape, Britain and France
could, of course, join. They both have important naval assets in the Indo-Pacific
(Chellaney, 2018, para.10).
Chellaney (April 2018) states:
The developments in the South China Sea carry far-reaching strategic implications for the
Indo-Pacific and for the international maritime order. They also highlight that the biggest
threat to maritime peace and security comes from unilateralism, especially altering the
territorial or maritime status quo by violating international norms and rules (para.2).
Chellaney (2018) states that the Council on Foreign Relations wrote an article that
recommends “in the absence of progress between China and ASEAN on a binding CoC to avert
crises in the South China Sea, the United States should encourage ASEAN to develop its own
draft CoC containing risk-reduction measures and a dispute-resolution mechanism (para.8).
The CFR also states that:
the United States should continue to help the Philippines and Vietnam enhance their
maritime policing and security capabilities, for example through better surveillance
systems, so they can deter and respond to China entering the water and airspace in their
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EEZs with impunity. Similar assistance should be extended to Malaysia if requested
(para.9).
Glaser (2015) states that:
The United States should be prepared to respond to future Chinese coercive acts
including using U.S. naval forces to deter China’s continuing use of “white
hulled” paramilitary vessels. Other responses, such as imposing economic
sanctions on Chinese energy companies should they drill in contested waters, are
also conceivable but should not be specified in advance. The United States should
state clearly and publicly that a declaration of an ADIZ by Beijing over the South
China Sea would be destabilizing and would not be recognized by Washington.
To further reduce the risk of an accident between U.S. and Chinese forces, the
two militaries should implement their joint commitment to conclude an agreement
on air-to-air encounters by the end of the year” (Conflict in the South China Sea.
(para.10).
The Center of Foreign Relations (CFR) states that:
U.S. interests in the South China Sea include freedom of navigation, unimpeded
passage for commercial shipping, and peaceful resolution of territorial disputes
according to international law. Failure to respond to Chinese coercion or use of
force could damage U.S. credibility, not only in Southeast Asia, but also in Japan,
where anxiety about intensified activity by Chinese military and paramilitary
forces is growing. Conflict in the South China Sea would put at risk the more than
$5 trillion in trade that passes through those strategic waters annually. Also at
stake is the U.S. relationship with China, including Washington's efforts to gain
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greater cooperation from Beijing on global issues such as combatting terrorism,
dealing with epidemics, confronting climate change, securing a deal on Iran's
nuclear program, and persuading North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons
(Glaser, 2015, para.6 ).
Glasor, (2015) also states that “to further reduce the risk of an accident between U.S. and
Chinese forces, the two militaries should implement their joint commitment to conclude an
agreement on air-to-air encounters by the end of the year” (para.12).
This topic is very fluid and relevant to the future of the United States and China relations.
Events are occurring as we speak, and history is being written. The future of our Nation is at risk
and the American people are focused on local politics. The SCS is a powder keg waiting to
explode and nobody is aware because American news is focused on internal politics and political
agendas. This thesis was written to inform the American people of the potential crisis in the
South China Sea and the impact it could have on the current trade war and geopolitical climate as
it revolves unknowingly around us. The author really thinks that China needs the United States
for trade purposes, and the author thinks both sides need each other which will reduce the risk of
conflict.
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